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| Battle of Beersheba | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of First World War | |||||||
 A photograph of a re-enactment of the Charge on Beersheba taken in early Feburary 1918. |
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| Belligerents | |||||||
 British Empire |
 Ottoman Empire |
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| Commanders | |||||||
Philip Chetwode Henry Chauvel |
Unknown | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
| 2 infantry divisions 2 mounted divisions |
1 infantry division | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| 1,200 | 1,400 prisoners | ||||||
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The Battle of Beersheba took place on 31 October 1917, as part of the Sinai and Palestine campaign during World War I. The Australian, 4th Light Horse Brigade, under Brigadier William Grant, charged more than four miles at the Turkish trenches, overran them and captured the wells at Beersheba.1 This is often reported as "the last successful cavalry charge in history,"1
Contents |
Prelude
The battle of Beersheba was the critical element of a wider British offensive, known as the Third Battle of Gaza, aimed at breaking the Turkish defensive line that stretched from Gaza on the Mediterranean shore to Beersheba, an outpost 30 miles inland.
Earlier in 1917, two previous attempts to breach this line had failed. Since the second failure in the Second Battle of Gaza, the British forces in Palestine had undergone a major upheaval with the replacement of General Archibald Murray with the distinguished cavalry commander, General Edmund Allenby, formerly the commander of the British Third Army on the Western Front.
It is often said that the Light Horsemens' charge at Beersheba was the last successful cavalry charge. This is something of an exaggeration, however. several subsequent cavalry charges could be said to be successful; for example, on 7 November 1917, the British 5th Mounted Brigade conducted a successful charge at Huj, while near Damascus, on 2 October 1918, the 9th Light Horse Regiment successfully charged a Turkish column three times its size and forced the column to surrender, making this event the last successful Australian mounted cavalry charge in history. The usage of the term "last" in the case of Beersheba also fails to acknowledge the use of cavalry during the Russian civil war subsequent to the ending of the war.
The Allied Forces:
Allenby's forces had undergone a major expansion so that he now had two corps of infantry; the XX Corps, commanded by General Philip Chetwode, and the XXI Corps. More significantly, with the formation of the British Yeomanry Mounted Division, he now had three mounted divisions which were combined to form the Desert Mounted Corps, commanded by General Henry Chauvel—the first Australian general to command an army corps.
The Desert Mounted Corps consisted of the following formations:
Anzac Mounted Division -
- 1st Light Horse Brigade: 1st Australian Light Horse Regiment, 2nd Australian Light Horse Regiment, and 3rd Australian Light Horse Regiment.
- 2nd Light Horse Brigade: 5th Australian Light Horse Regiment, 6th Australian Light Horse Regiment, and 7th Australian Light Horse Regiment.
- New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade: Auckland Mounted Rifle Regiment, Canterbury Mounted Rifle Regiment, and the Wellington Mounted Rifle Regiment.
Australian Mounted Division
- 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade: 8th Australian Light Horse Regiment, 9th Australian Light Horse Regiment, and 10th Australian Light Horse Regiment.
- 4th Australian Light Horse Brigade: 4th Australian Light Horse Regiment, 11th Australian Light Horse Regiment, and 12th Australian Light Horse Regiment.
- 5th Mounted Brigade: 1/1st Warwickshire Yeomanry, 1/1st Royal Gloucestershire Hussars, and 1/1st Queen's Own Worcestershire Hussars.
Yeomanry Mounted Division -
- 6th Mounted Brigade: 1/1st Bucks Hussars Yeomanry, 1/1st Berkshire Yeomanry, and 1/1st Queen's Own Dorset Yeomanry
- 8th Mounted Brigade: 1/1st City of London Yeomanry, 1/1st County of London Yeomanry, and 1/3rd County of London Yeomanry.
- 22nd Mounted Brigade: 1/1st Lincolnshire Yeomanry, 1/1st Staffordshire Yeomanry, and 1/1st East Riding of Yorkshire Yeomanry.
Corps Cavalry
- 7th Mounted Brigade: 1/1st Sherwood Rangers Yeomanry, and 1/1st South Nottinghamshire Hussars.
Imperial Camel Corps - 1st Australian Battalion, 2nd British Battalion, 3rd Australian Battalion, and 4th Australian and New Zealand Battalion.
The Turkish Forces:
According to Major General Hüseyin Hüsnü Emir (Erkilet)2 the Turkish forces at Beersheba under the command of Ismet Bey included the following formations:
2 batteries from the 2nd Battalion, 43rd Artillery Regiment with 8 guns positioned on the west front between Beersheba-Tel esh Sheria railway and Wadi Saba.
2 Battalions of 81st Regiment at the front, 2nd Infantry Company at reserve on the back of right wing, while an Infantry Company was ordered to protect Ebu Rakik Station and Bridge and cover the region between Ebu Rakik and Beersheba.
2 Batteries of the 1st Battalion, 13th Artillery Regiment was positioned with 2 batteries on its left side creating a common defence position with 8 guns at south west front between Wadi Saba and Damascus and Pelune Hills.
67th Infantry Regiment with 2 battalions of infantry, 4th Battalion of the 79th Regiment, 1st Battalion of the 81st Regiment with 3 battalions positioned at the front and a reserve battalion at the rear.
A Battery of 2nd Battalion of the 39th Artillery Regiment was positioned on the north of Izmir Hill on southern front along from Şam(Damascus) Hill to the road to Sebi-Hafir to the beginning of Valley Vadiü'ş-Şuayb with 4 guns
2 battalions of the 48th Regiment was positioned at both sides of the road with a reserve battalion at the rear in the west.
A field battery from the 2nd Battalion of 39th Artillery Regiment positioned as general reserve with 8 guns.
The 3rd Cavalry Division provided a mounted battery used as anti aircraft canon at the redoubt west of Beersheba.
The 2nd Infantry Regiment was deployed with its 3 battalions but they had no machine guns.
The deployed manpower was:
The western front: 900 rifles mainly from the 81st Infantry Regiment
The southwest front: 1400 rifles mainly from the 67th Infantry Regiment
The southern front: 900 rifles mainly from the 48th Infantry Regiment
The General Reserve which included the 3rd Cavalry Division: 1200 rifles.
Total: 4400 Rifles, 60 Machine Guns, and 28 field guns were available for the defence of Beersheba.
The defences were strong to the south and west (towards Gaza) but to the east depended heavily on a strong redoubt at Tel el Saba, three miles east of the town.
A map of the Turkish troop dispositions on the morning of 31 October 1917 and the subsequent course of the battle at Beersheba produced by the Turkish General Staff is available at the Australian Light Horse Studies Centre - Turkish map
The plan
The plan to break the Gaza-Beersheba line had been formulated by General Chetwode following the failure of the two frontal assaults against Gaza. The Turkish defences were formidable in the vicinity of Gaza but in the east there was a wide gap between the last redoubt and the Beersheba fortifications. The Turks trusted that the lack of reliable water in this region, other than at the wells in Beersheba, would limit British operations to mounted raids.
Chetwode believed that the lack of water would be easier to overcome than the Gaza fortifications and so a mammoth engineering and supply effort was undertaken to make a forward base in the vicinity of Beersheba from which infantry and mounted troops could stage an assault. The plan, however, depended on the town and water supply being captured swiftly. If the attack was repulsed on the first day, the British would be forced to retire in search of water.
When Allenby took command, he set about implementing Chetwode's plan. The attack was to be made by two infantry divisions of the XX Corps (60th (London) Division and the 74th (Yeomanry) Division) and two mounted divisions of the Desert Mounted Corps (Anzac Mounted Division and Australian Mounted Division). The infantry, supported by heavy artillery, would attack from the south-west against the strongest Beersheba defences while the mounted brigades would circle to the south and east. Once the outlying defences were overcome, it was intended to make a dismounted attack against Beersheba itself.
An integral part of Allenby's plan was the planting of false information to deceive the Turks that a repeat of the earlier offensives was planned. His Intelligence Officer, Major Richard Meinertzhagen, rode to within rifle range of the Turkish outposts at Gaza and ostentatiously took notes. When the Turks fired at him, he reeled in the saddle as if wounded and galloped off, leaving behind his rifle and binoculars, and a haversack stained with fresh blood (actually his horse's). The haversack contained details of the dummy plan of attack. To further convince the Turks that the information was genuine, British units were given orders to search for the haversack, and Meinertzhagen was subjected to a mock Court of Enquiry, which then published general orders forbidding staff officers to carry sensitive documents near the front lines.
While the Meinertzhagen story was wonderfully romantic to a post war Western audience, it fooled no one in the Turkish forces. Turkish records clearly indicate that they suspected that this was a ruse from the moment Meinertzhagen's items were discovered and so ignored their content. In reality, Turkish assessments had already ascertained where the likely attacks were to come from in attempting to break out into Palestine. In a telegram despatched on 16 August 1917 to the Turkish Commander of the 4th Army, the intentions of the Allied forces had been clearly detailed by the intelligence analysts. A copy of the telegram may be viewed at Turkish understanding of projected Allied attacks, August 1917. The only thing they were missing was the actual date. They soon gained a reasonable idea of the timetable when the rail line terminated at Karm, a settlement between Gaza and Beersheba, on 25 October 1917.
The occupation of Karm was vital for two aspects of the upcoming battle. The long term purpose was as a major point of supply and water for the Allied troops in the immediate area. The placement of the station at Karm gave a clear, although at the time, misleading signal to the Turks that their bases at Abu Hareira and Tel el Sheria were under threat of immediate attack. Between these two bases was a massive layer of trenches and redoubts known as the Rushdie System which formed a powerful bulwark against any Allied action. Karm Station pointed right to the heart of this system. The Allied forces converted a line of observation outposts into fortified redoubts to protect this major supply depot from attack. The one thing that worried Chauvel was the potential for artillery to be moved from the Turkish base at Abu Hareira in the hills and down to el Imara on the plains from where they could pour devastating fire with High Explosive shells upon the rail line and stations. In testing the resolve of the Allies, on 27 October 1917, the Turkish 3rd Cavalry, along with infantry support from the 16th Infantry Division, mounted a reconnaissance in force at a line encompassing El Buqqar, Hill 720 and Hill 630. The consequent battle led to the heroic resistance of the London Yeomanry at Hill 720 where two troops from the 1/1st County of London Yeomanry under the command of Major Alexander Malius "Laffy" Lafone fought to the last man. Lafone won a posthumous Victoria Cross for this action. Later that day, the 9th Light Horse Regiment supported by elements of the 74th (Yeomanry) Division on the right and 53rd Division on the left, slowly won back any ground that was lost. This convinced the Turks that an attack on Beersheba would come very soon.
Nevertheless, Allenby based his plan on surprise far more than on mere superiority in numbers to gain success and the action at El Buqqar was sufficient to keep the Turks guessing as to the true intentions. Allenby despatched some 40,000 men to tackle Beersheba held by 4,400 men giving a superiority ratio of almost 10:1 which were good odds upon which to secure a comfortable victory.
The infantry attack
The attack on Beersheba by Chetwode's XX Corps commenced at 5.55am on 31 October when the artillery, more than 100 field guns and howitzers, commenced bombarding the Turkish trenches. Twenty of the heavy guns were engaged in counter-battery work against the enemy artillery, which was operated by Austrian gunners.
The first infantry went in at 8.30am to capture some Turkish outposts. The main attack of four infantry brigades began at 12.15pm. They quickly reached all their initial objectives and so were in position for the main assault on the township to coincide with the light horse and New Zealanders.
The charge of the 4th Light Horse Brigade
Chauvel had planned to make a dismounted attack on Beersheba but he was now out of time. The alternative was to make a cavalry charge. He had in reserve south-west of the town, two brigades of the Australian Mounted Division; the Australian 4th Light Horse Brigade and the British 5th Mounted Brigade (the 3rd Light Horse had been sent to support the attack on Tel el Saba). The British brigade was a proper cavalry brigade, armed with swords, however the light horse brigade was closer to the town. Both brigades were eager to make the attack but Chauvel, with time running out, chose the 4th Light Horse.
The 4th Light Horse Brigade, commanded by Brigadier William Grant, contained the 4th (Victorian), 11th (Queensland and South Australia) and 12th (New South Wales) Light Horse Regiments. The 11th was dispersed but the 4th and 12th were quickly ready to make the charge. Although Grant commanded the Brigade, the charge on Beersheba was led by Lieutenant Colonel Bourchier.
The regiments commenced the charge at 4.30pm, the 12th on the left and the 4th on the right. They advanced by squadrons (ie., 3 waves) with about 500 yards between squadrons. The were armed with bayonets in hand; their rifles slung over their shoulders. The 11th Regiment and the 5th Mounted Brigade followed more slowly to the rear and the British 7th Mounted Brigade, which was attached to the Desert Mounted Corps headquarters, also approached from the south.
The Austrian artillery opened fire with shrapnel from long range but it was ineffective against the widely spaced horsemen. Turkish machine guns that opened fire from the left (which might have inflicted heavy casualties) were quickly silenced by a battery of horse artillery. When the line of horsemen got within range of the Turkish riflemen in the trenches, they started to take casualties but the defenders failed to allow for the speed of their approach so once they were within half a mile of the trenches, the defenders' bullets started passing overhead as they forgot to adjust their sights.
The light horsemen jumped the front trenches and dismounted behind the line where they turned and engaged the Turks with bayonets. The Turks were in many cases so demoralised that they quickly surrendered. One Australian who was dazed after having his horse shot from under him, recovered to find his five attackers with their hands up, waiting to be taken prisoner.
The later waves continued through the town which the Turks were abandoning in a panic. The charge was finally halted on the far (north west) side of Beersheba where the light horsemen encountered more Turkish defences. Isolated resistance in the town continued for a little while but by nightfall, the remainder of the garrison had been captured. The Turks had attempted to torch some buildings and blow up the railway but the majority of the wells (15 out of 17) were captured intact. Also, a heavy rainfall left temporary pools of water on the ground, allowing the horses to drink.
In a later report, Bourchier summed up the effect of the attack:3 "In commenting on the attack I consider that the success was due to the rapidity with which the movement was carried out. Owing to the volume of fire brought to bear from the enemy's position by Machine Guns and rifles, a dismounted attack would have resulted in a much greater number of casualties. It was noticed also that the morale of the enemy was greatly shaken through our troops galloping over his positions thereby causing his riflemen and machine gunners to lose all control of fire discipline. When the troops came within short range of the trenches the enemy seemed to direct almost all his fire at the horses." He also noted that "this method of attack would not have been practicable were it not for the absence of barbed wire and entanglements."3
Aftermath
In the capture of Beersheba, the 4th Light Horse Brigade took 38 officers and 700 other ranks prisoner as well as four field guns. In the two regiments, only 31 men were killed (including two officers) and only 36 men wounded (including eight officers). The total losses incurred by the Desert Mounted Corps was 53 men killed and 144 wounded. The heaviest Allied losses were suffered by the British infantry whose XXth Corps lost 116 killed in action and thus paved the way for the cavalry victories.
Popular Culture
The battle is portrayed in:
Books
- "The wells of Beersheba", 1933, by Frank Dalby Davison
Films
- The 1940 film 40,000 Horsemen[1]
- The 1987 film The Lighthorsemen
- The 1992 direct to video film The Adventures of Young Indiana Jones: Daredevils of the Desert[2]
References
- ^ a b "Oct. 31, 1917: Last Charge at Beersheba Turns a Page in Military History", Wired.com, Wired Magazine (October 31, 2007). Retrieved on 1 November 2007.
- ^ Major General Hüseyin Hüsnü Emir (Erkilet), Yıldırım, Ankara 1922, p.112
- ^ a b Bou, Jean (2006). "Cavalry, Firepower, and Swords: The Australian Light Horse and the Tactical Lessons of Cavalry Operations in Palestine, 1916–1918" (PDF). The Journal of Military History 71 (1): 99–125. doi:, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_military_history/v071/71.1bou.pdf. Retrieved on 16 March 2007.
Bibliography
- Grainger, John D, The Battle for Palestine, 1917 (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2006)
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