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Consociationalism is a form of government involving guaranteed group representation, and is often suggested for managing conflict in deeply divided societies. It is often viewed as synonymous with power-sharing, although it is technically only one form of power-sharing.¹

Consociationalism was discussed in academic terms by the political scientist Arend Lijphart. However, Lijphart has stated that he had "merely discovered what political practitioners had repeatedly – and independently of^clarify both academic experts and one another – invented years earlier".² John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary trace consociationalism back to 1917, when it was first employed in the Netherlands.³ Indeed, Lijphart draws heavily on the experience of the Netherlands in developing his argument in favour of the consociational approach to ethnic conflict regulation. The Netherlands, as a consociational state, was between 1857 and 1967 divided into four non-territorial pillars: Calvinist, Catholic, socialist and liberal (although until 1917 there was a first past the post electoral system rather than a consociational one). In their heyday, each comprised tightly-organised groups, schools, universities, hospitals and newspapers, all divided along a pillarised social structure. The theory, according to Lijphart, focuses on the role of social elites, their agreement and co-operation, as the key to a stable democracy.

The goals of consociationalism are governmental stability, the survival of the power-sharing arrangements, the survival of democracy and the avoidance of violence. When consociationalism is organised along religious confessional lines, it is known as confessionalism, as is the case in Lebanon.

Contents 1 Characteristics 2 Favourable conditions 3 Advantages 4 Criticisms 4.1 Brian Barry 4.2 Rinus van Schendelen 4.3 Lustick on hegemonic control 4.4 Other criticisms 5 Examples of consociational arrangements 6 See also 7 References

Characteristics

Lijphart identifies four key characteristics of consociational democracies:⁴

Name	Explantion
Grand coalition	Elites of each pillar come together to rule in the interests of society because they recognize the dangers of non-cooperation.
Mutual veto	Consensus among the groups is required to confirm the majority rule. Mutuality means that the minority is unlikely to successfully block the majority. If one group blocks another on some matter, the latter are likely to block the former in return.
Proportionality	Representation is based on population. If one pillar accounts for 30% of the overall society, then they occupy 30% of the positions on the police force, in civil service, and in other national and civic segments of society.
Segmental autonomy	Creates a sense of individuality and allows for different culturally-based community laws.

Favourable conditions

Lijphart also identifies a number of 'favourable conditions' under which consociationalism is likely to be successful. He has changed the specification of these conditions somewhat over time.⁵ Michael Kerr summarises Lijphart's most prominent favourable factors as:⁶

• Segmental isolation of ethnic communities
• A multiple balance of power
• The presence of external threats common to all communities
• Overarching loyalties to the state
• A tradition of elite accommodation
• Socioeconomic equality
• A small population size, reducing the policy load
• A moderate multi-party system with segmental parties

Lijphart stresses that these conditions are neither indispensable nor sufficient to account for the success of consociationalism.⁴ This has led Rinus van Schendelen to conclude that "the conditions may be present and absent, necessary and unnecessary, in short conditions or no conditions at all".⁷

John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary argue that three conditions are key to the establishment of democratic consociational power-sharing: elites have to be motivated to engage in conflict regulation; elites must lead deferential segments; and there must be a multiple balance of power, but more importantly the subcultures must be stable.⁸ Michael Kerr, in his study of the role of external actors in power-sharing arrangements in Northern Ireland and Lebanon, adds to McGarry and O'Leary's list the condition that "the existence of positive external regulating pressures, from state to non-state actors, which provide the internal elites with sufficient incentives and motives for their acceptance of, and support for, consociation".⁶

Advantages

In a consociational state, all groups, including minorities, are represented on the political and economic stage. Supporters of consociationalism argue that it is a more realistic option in deeply divided societies than integrationist approaches to conflict resolution.⁹ It has been credited with supporting successful and non-violent transitions to democracy in countries such as South Africa.^{citation needed}

Criticisms

Brian Barry

Brian Barry has questioned the nature of the divisions that exist in the countries that Lijphart considers to be 'classic cases' of consociational democracies. For example, he makes the case that in the Swiss example, "political parties cross-cut cleavages in the society and provide a picture of remarkable consensus rather than highly structured conflict of goals".¹⁰ In the case of the Netherlands, he argues that "the whole cause of the disagreement was the feeling of some Dutchman...that it mattered what all the inhabitants of the country believed. Demands for policies aimed at producing religious or secular uniformity presuppose a concern...for the state of grace of one's fellow citizens". He contrasts this to the case of a society marked by conflict, in this case Northern Ireland, where he argues that "the inhabitants…have never shown much worry about the prospects of the adherents of the other religion going to hell".¹¹ Barry concludes that in the Dutch case, consociationalism is tautological and argues that "the relevance of the 'consociational' model for other divided societies is much more doubtful than is commonly supposed".¹²

Rinus van Schendelen

Van Schendelen has argued that Lijphart uses evidence selectively. Pillarisation was "seriously weakening," even in the 1950s, cross-denominational co-operation was increasing, and formerly coherent political sub-cultures were dissolving. He argued that elites in the Netherlands were not motivated by preferences derived from the general interest, but rather by self-interest. They formed coalitions not to forge consociational negotiation between segments but to improve their parties' respective power. He argued that the Netherlands was "stable" in that it had few protests or riots, but that it was so before consociationalism, and that it was not stable from the standpoint of government turnover. He questioned the extent to which the Netherlands, or indeed any country labelled a consociational system, could be called a democracy, and whether calling a consociational country a democracy isn't somehow ruled out by definition. He believed that Lijphart suffered severe problems of rigor when identifying whether particular divisions were cleavages, whether particular cleavages were segmental, and whether particular cleavages were cross-cutting.⁷

Lustick on hegemonic control

Ian Lustick has argued that academics lack an alternative 'control' approach for explaining stability in deeply divided societies and that this has resulted in the empirical overextension of consociational models.¹³ Lustick argues that Lijphart has "an impressionistic methodological posture, flexible rules for coding data, and an indefatigable, rhetorically seductive commitment to promoting consociationalism as a widely applicable principle of political engineering"¹⁴, that results in him applying consociational theory to case studies that it does not fit. Furthermore, Lustick states that "Lijphart's definition of 'accommodation'...includes the elaborately specified claim that issues dividing polarized blocs are settled by leaders convinced of the need for settlement".¹⁵

Other criticisms

Critics point out that consociationalism is dangerous in a system of differing antagonistic ideologies, generally conservatism and communism. They state that specific conditions must exist for three or more groups to develop a multi-party system with strong leaders. This philosophy is dominated by elites, with those masses that are sidelined with the elites having less to lose if war breaks out. Consociationalism cannot be imperially applied. For example, it does not effectively apply to Austria. Critics also point to the failure of this line of reasoning in Lebanon, a country that reverted back to civil war. It only truly applies in Switzerland, Belgium and the Netherlands, and not in more deeply divided societies. If one of three groups gets half plus one of the vote, then the other groups are in perpetual opposition, which is largely incompatible with consociationalism.

Consociationalism focuses on diverging identities such as ethnicity instead of integrating identities such as class, institutionalizing and entrenching the former. Furthermore, it relies on rival co-operation, which is inherently unstable. It focuses on intrastate relations and neglects relations with other states. Donald Horowitz argues that consociationalism can lead to the reification of ethnic divisions, since "grand coalitions are unlikely, because of the dynamics of intraethnic competition. The very act of forming a multiethnic coalition generates intraethnic competition – flanking – if it does not already exist".¹⁶

Consociationalism assumes that each group is cohesive and has strong leadership. Although the minority can block decisions, this requires 100 per cent agreement. Rights are given to communities rather than individuals, leading to over-representation of some individuals in society and under-representation of others. Grand coalitions are unlikely to happen due to the dynamics of ethnic competition. Each group seeks more power for itself. Consociationalists are criticized for focusing too much on the set up of institutions and not enough on transitional issues which go beyond such institutions. Finally, it is claimed that consociational institutions promote sectarianism and entrench existing identities.

Examples of consociational arrangements

The political systems of a number of countries operate on a consociational basis, including, Belgium, Lebanon, The Netherlands (from 1917 until 1967), Switzerland and Nigeria. Some academics have also argued that the European Union resembles a consociational democracy.¹⁷¹⁸

Additionally, a number of peace agreements are consociational, including the Dayton Agreement that ended the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is described as a "classic example of consociational settlement" by Sumantra Bose¹⁹ and "an ideal-typical consociational democracy" by Roberto Belloni,²⁰ and the Belfast Agreement of 1998 in Northern Ireland (and its subsequent reinforcement with 2006's St Andrews Agreement), which Brendan O'Leary describes as "power-sharing plus".²¹

See also

• Conflict management
• Consociational state
• Consensus democracy
• Minority groups
• Minority rights

References

1. ^ O'Leary, Brendan (2005). "Debating consociational politics: Normative and explanatory arguments", in Noel, Sid JR: From Power Sharing to Democracy: Post-Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies. Montreal: McGill-Queen's Press, 3-43. ISBN 0773529489. 
2. ^ Arend Lijphart (2004) 'Constitutional design for divided societies', Journal of Democracy 15(2), pp. 96-109, p. 97
3. ^ John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary (1993) 'Introduction: The macro-political regulation of ethnic conflict', in John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary (eds.) The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation: Case Studies of Protracted Ethnic Conflicts, London: Routledge, pp. 1-40
4. ^ ^{a b} Arend Lijphart (1977) Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press
5. ^ Bogaards, Matthijs (1998). "The favourable factors for consociational democracy: A review". European Journal of Political Research: 475-496, http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/119121225/abstract?CRETRY=1&SRETRY=0. 
6. ^ ^{a b} Kerr, Michael. Imposing Power-Sharing: Conflict and Coexistence in Northern Ireland and Lebanon. Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 27-28. 
7. ^ ^{a b} van Schendelen, M.C.P.M.. "The views of Arend Lijphart and collected criticisms". Acta Politica 19 (1): 19-49. 
8. ^ McGarry, John; O'Leary, Brendan (1995). Explaining Northern Ireland: Broken Images. Oxford: Blackwell, 339. 
9. ^ John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary (2006) 'Consociational theory, Northern Ireland's conflict, and its agreement 2: What critics of consociation can learn from Northern Ireland', Government and Opposition 41(2), pp. 249-277
10. ^ Brian Barry (1979a) 'Political accommodation and consociational democracy', British Journal of Political Science 5(4), pp. 477-505, p. 501
11. ^ Brian Barry (1979b) 'The consociational model and its dangers', European Journal of Political Research 3(4), pp. 393-412, p. 407
12. ^ Brian Barry (1979a), p. 481
13. ^ Ian Lustick (1979) 'Stability in deeply divided societies: Consociationalism versus control', World Politics 31(3), pp. 325-344
14. ^ Ian Lustick (1997) 'Lijphart, Lakatos, and consociationalism', World Politics 50(1), pp. 88-117, p. 117
15. ^ Ian Lustick (1997), p. 100
16. ^ Donald Horowitz (1985) Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, p. 575
17. ^ Gabel, Matthew J. (1998). "The endurance of supranational governance: A consociational interpretation of the European Union". Comparative Politics 30 (4): 463–475. doi:10.2307/422334, http://www.jstor.org/pss/422334. 
18. ^ Bogaards, Matthijs; Crepaz, Markus M.L. (2002). "Consociational interpretations of the European Union". European Union Politics 3 (3): 357–381. doi:10.1177/1465116502003003004, http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/content/refs/3/3/357. 
19. ^ Sumantra Bose (2002) Bosnia After Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 216
20. ^ Roberto Belloni (2004) 'Peacebuilding and consociational electoral engineering in Bosnia and Herzegovina', International Peacekeeping 11(2), pp. 334-353, p. 336
21. ^ Brendan O'Leary (1999) 'The 1998 British-Irish Agreement: Power-sharing plus', Scottish Affairs 26, pp. 14-35

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