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The Song Dynasty (Chinese: 宋朝; pinyin: Sòng cháo; 960-1279) of China was a ruling dynasty that controlled China proper and southern China from the middle of the 10th century into the last quarter of the 13th century. The Song Dynasty is considered a height of classical Chinese innovation in science and technology, with figures such as Shen Kuo and Su Song, and revolutionary new use of gunpowder weapons (catapult-projected bombs, fire lances, flamethrowers, and land mines). However, it was also a period of political and military turmoil. There were opposing and often aggressive political factions formed at court, which in many ways impeded progress. The frontier management policies of the Chancellor Wang Anshi exacerbated hostile conditions along the Chinese-Vietnamese border, sparking a border war with the Lý Dynasty. Although this conflict was fought to a mutual draw, there was an enormous military defeat at the hands of invading Jurchens from the north in 1127, forcing the remnants of the Song court to flee south from Kaifeng and establish a new capital at Hangzhou. It was there that new naval strength was built to combat the Jurchen's Jin Dynasty formed in the north. Although the Song Dynasty was able to defeat further Jurchen invasions, the Mongols led by Genghis Khan, Ögedei Khan, Möngke Khan, and finally Kublai Khan gradually conquered China, until the fall of the Song Dynasty in 1279.
Founding of the Song
- Further information: List of Song Emperors
The Later Zhou Dynasty was the last of the Five Dynasties that had controlled northern China after the fall of the Tang Dynasty in 907. Zhao Kuangyin, later known as Emperor Taizu (r. 960–976), usurped the throne with the support of military commanders, initiating the Song Dynasty. Upon taking the throne in 960, his first goal was the reunification of China after half a century of political division. This included the conquests of Nanping, Wu-Yue, Southern Han, Later Shu, and Southern Tang in the south as well as the Northern Han and the Sixteen Prefectures in the north. With capable military officers such as Yang Ye (d. 986), Liu Tingrang (929—987), Cao Bin (931—999) and Huyan Zan (d. 1000), the early Song military became the dominant force in China. Techniques of warfare such as defending supply lines across floating pontoon bridges led to success in battle; such was the case in the Song assault against the Southern Tang state while crossing the Yangzi River in 974.[1] Using a mass of arrow fire from crossbowmen, Song forces were able to defeat the renowned war elephant corps of the Southern Han on January 23, 971, thus gaining the submission of Southern Han while terminating the first and last elephant corps that would make up a regular division within a Chinese army.[2]
Consolidation in the south was completed in 978 with the conquest of Wu-Yue. Song military forces then turned north in a campaign to conquer the Northern Han, which fell to Song forces in 979. However, efforts to take the Sixteen Prefectures was never accomplished, as they were incorporated earlier into the Liao state based in Manchuria to the immediate north.[3] To the far northwest, the Tanguts had been in power over northern Shaanxi since 881. This came about when the earlier Tang court appointed a Tangut chief as a military governor (jiedushi) over the region, a seat that became hereditary (forming the Xi-Xia Dynasty).[4] Although the Song state would find its military match with the Liao Dynasty, the Song gained significant military victories against the Western Xia (who would eventually fall to the Mongol conquest of Ghengis Khan in 1227).[5]
After political consolidation through military conquest, Emperor Taizu held a famous banquet inviting the many high-ranking military officers that had served him in Song's various conquests. As his military officers drank wine and feasted with Taizu, he spoke to them about the potential of a military coup against him like seen in the previous era. His military officers protested against this notion, and that none were as qualified as him to lead the country. The passage of this account in the Song Shi follows as such:
The emperor said, 'The life of man is short. Happiness is to have the wealth and means to enjoy life, and then to be able to leave the same prosperity to one's descendents. If you, my officers, will renounce your military authority, retire to the provinces, and choose there the best lands and the most delightful dwelling-places, there to pass the rest of your lives in pleasure and peace...would this not be better than to live a life of peril and uncertainty? So that no shadow of suspicion shall remain between prince and ministers, we will ally our families with marriages, and thus, ruler and subject linked in friendship and amity, we will enjoy tranquility'...The following day, the army commanders all offered their resignations, reporting (imaginary) maladies, and withdrew to the country districts, where the emperor, giving them splendid gifts, appointed them to high official positions.[6]
Emperor Taizu built an effective centralized bureaucracy staffed with civilian scholar-officials. Regional military governors and their supporters were replaced by centrally appointed officials. This system of civilian rule led to a greater concentration of power in the emperor and his palace bureaucracy than had been achieved in the previous dynasties. In the early 11th century, there was some 30,000 men who took the prefectural exams (see imperial examination), which steadily increased to roughly 80,000 by the end of the century, and to a whopping 400,000 exam takers during the 13th century.[7] Although new municipal governments were often established, the same number of prefectures and provinces were in place. This meant that although more people were taking exams, roughly the same number were being accepted into the government as in previous periods, making the civil service exams very competitive amongst aspiring students and scholars. There were also other benefits of Taizu's scholarly, merit-driven system of exam graduates staffed in and maintaining the central, provincial, and local bureaucracies.
Emperor Taizu also found other ways to consolidate and strengthen his power, including updated map-making (cartography) so that his central administration could easily discern how to handle affairs in the provinces. In 971, he ordered Lu Duosun to update and 're-write all the Tu Jing [maps] in the world', which would seem to be a daunting task for one individual. Nonetheless, he was sent out and traveled throughout the provinces to collect illustrative gazetteers and as much data as possible.[8] With the aid of Song Zhun, the massive work was completed in 1010, with some 1566 chapters.[8][9] The later Song Shi historical text stated (Wade-Giles spelling):
Yuan Hsieh (d. +1220) was Director-General of governmental grain stores. In pursuance of his schemes for the relief of famines he issued orders that each pao (village) should prepare a map which would show the fields and mountains, the rivers and the roads in fullest detail. The maps of all the pao were joined together to make a map of the tu (larger district), and these in turn were joined with others to make a map of the hsiang and the hsien (still larger districts). If there was any trouble about the collection of taxes or the distribution of grain, or if the question of chasing robbers and bandits arose, the provincial officials could readily carry out their duties by the aid of the maps.[8]
Taizu also displayed a venerable interest in science and technology. He employed the Imperial Workshop to support such projects as Zhang Sixun's hydraulic-powered armillary sphere (for astronomical observation and time-keeping) that used liquid mercury instead of water to operate it (due to the fact that liquid mercury would not freeze during winter).[10] Emperor Taizu was also quite open-minded in his affairs, especially with those perceived as foreigners, since he appointed the Arab Muslim Ma Yize (910-1005) as the chief astronomer of the Song court. For receiving envoys from the Korean kingdom of Goryeo alone, the Song court had roughly 1,500 volumes written about the nuanced rules, regulations, and guidelines for their reception.[11] The Song also sent envoys abroad, such as Wang Yande (939–1006) who was sent as an official envoy to the Uyghur-Turkic city of Gaochang in 981,[12] then under Kara-Khanid control.
Relations with Liao and Western Xia
- Further information: Liao Dynasty and Western Xia
The Great Ditch and Treaty of Shanyuan
During the first couple decades of rule, relations between the Song and Liao (led by the Khitans) were relatively peaceful, the two outstanding issues of the Northern Han and Sixteen Prefectures notwithstanding. In 974, the two began exchanging embassies on New Years Day. However, this peace was an illusion as the Song was more concerned with consolidating the south. In 979, the Song moved against the Northern Han, long under the protection of the Liao Dynasty. The Song emperor succeeded in bringing the Northern Han into the fold, but when marching on the Liao Southern Capital (present-day Beijing,) in the Sixteen Prefectures, Song forces were defeated at the Battle of Gaoliang River.[13] The defeat in this battle was very politically damaging to the prestige of Emperor Taizong of Song (r. 976–997), so much so that his top military commanders orchestrated an aborted coup to place his nephew Dezhao on the throne.[14]
Relations between the Song and Liao remained tense and hostile. In 986 the Song sent three armies against the Liao in an effort to take advantage of an infant emperor and recapture the Sixteen Prefectures, yet the Liao successfully repulsed all three armies sent against them.[15] Following this, diplomatic relations were resumed.[13]
However, relations between Song and Liao worsened in the 990s. From 993 to 1004, the Liao observed the Song as the latter built a 'Great Ditch' in northern Hebei province from the Taihang Mountains in the west all the way to the Bohai Sea in the east.[16] This was essentially a series of canals meant to block the advance of Liao cavalry far from the northern border line, although the Liao perceived this engineering project as a means for the Song to dispatch offensive forces more efficiently via new waterways.[17] In 999 the Liao began annual attacks on Song positions, though with no breakthrough victories. The Liao were interested in capturing the Guannan region of northern Hebei, both because the Song general Zhou Shizong had taken it from them and because it contained strategic passes.[18]
In 1004 Liao forces managed to march deep into Song territory, camping out in Shanyuan, about 100 kilometers (60 miles) north of the Song capital of Kaifeng. However, their forces were greatly overextended and any possible escape route was in danger of being blocked by Song forces.[19] The completion of the 'Great Ditch' as an effective defensive blockade which slowed the advance of Liao cavalry also had much to do with the Liao desiring a truce.[20] Following negotiations resulted in the Treaty of Shanyuan, signed in January 1005 (some sources cite 1004 due to the Chinese Lunar Calendar), which fixed the borders of the Song and Liao as they were before the conflict.[18] The Khitan rulers also wanted to intermarry with the Zhao family line of the Song, an offer that the Song refused in favor of a nominal and figurative imperial kinship.[21] However, the treaty required annual tribute payments to the Liao and recognition of Liao equality with the Song.[22] The tribute consisted of 283 kg (100,000 oz) of silver along with 200,000 bolts of silk, with an increased amount to 500,000 units by 1042.[3] However, even with the increase in tribute by 1042, the Song Dynasty economy was not damaged extensively. The bullion holding of the Liao Dynasty did not increase with the tribute bearing, since the Song exported many goods annually to the Liao Dynasty, which usually dwarfed the amount of imported goods that Song purchased from Liao.[3] This meant that much of the silver sent to Liao as tribute was used to pay for Song Chinese goods, hence the silver wound up back into the hands of Chinese merchants and the Song government.
Until the Song Dynasty took advantage of a large rebellion within the Liao Kingdom in 1125, the Liao Dynasty had to be dealt with somewhat cordially. Skilled ambassadors were sent on missions to court the Liao Dynasty and maintain peace, ambassadors such as the renowned horologist, engineer, and state minister Su Song.[23] The Song also prepared for armed conflict if necessary, increasing the overall size of the armed forces to 1 million soldiers by 1022.[3] By that time, however, the military was consuming three-quarters of the tax revenues gathered by the state, compared to a mere 2 or 3 percent of state income that would be consumed by just providing the Liao with tribute.[3] Due to these circumstances, intense political rivalries would later arise in the Song court over how to handle these issues and others.
Conflict and diplomacy in the northwest
The Song came into conflict with the Tanguts of the Western Xia Dynasty as early as the 980s, when Song intended to retake the former Ordos prefectures of the late Tang Dynasty, then held by the Tanguts.[24]. After the Tangut leader Li Jiqian died in 1004, the Tanguts under his successor Li Deming (r. 1005–1032) had attacked the Song, but they ultimately sought peaceful relations that fostered economic benefits until 1038.[25][26]
The Tanguts under Li Yuanhao (1003–1048) retaliated against Song due to a non-Chinese Song patrol leader Li Jipeng (aka Zhao Baozhong) who raided Xia's territory and destroyed some fortified settlements.[27] On September 12, 1034 the Tanguts raided Qingzhou in Huanqing Circuit, but later Li Yuanhao released Song officers and soldiers he had captured; by January 29, 1035 relations were restored when Li Yuanhao sent tribute of fifty horses to the Song court and requested a copy of a Buddhist canon in return, which he received.[27] Although he retained some unique Tangut customs and had a Tangut script created, Li's administration followed the traditional Chinese model of bureaus.[28] Li proclaimed himself the first imperial ruler of Western Xia, ruling as Emperor Jingzong (r. 1038–1048), and on November 10, 1038 he sent an envoy to the Song capital in order to gain recognition for his new title as "Son of Blue Heaven" and to cease paying tribute to Song to affirm his new status.[29] The Xia began attacks on Song's borders which were repulsed by Song commander Lu Shouqin (fl. 1030–1050), and on January 9, 1039 the Song shut down its border markets and soon after a reward of 100,000 strings of cash was offered to anyone who could capture Emperor Jingzong.[30] Although he won impressive victories in the initial phase of the war, Jingzong gained no additional territory for Western Xia by war's end in 1044, while both sides had lost tens of thousands of troops.[31][32] Emperor Jingzong also conceded to the Song demand that he refer to himself as an inferior subject when addressing the Song, and that he accept Song ritualists to perform official ceremonies at his court.[33] Throughout the war, the Song had maintained a number of fortified military outposts stretching some 480 km (300 mi) from the westernmost prefectures of Shaanxi to Hedong in what is now Shanxi.[34] Since the Song could not rely on water obstacle defenses in this region—like the Great Ditch of Hebei used against Liao—they instead garrisoned the wide expanse with a recorded 200 imperial battalions and 900 provincial and militia battalions by 1043.[34]
Relations broke down once more in 1067 with the ascension of Emperor Shenzong of Song,[35] and in the 1070s the Song gained considerable success in capturing Tangut territory. A mood of frontier adventurism permeated Shenzong's court, as well as a desire to reclaim territories he felt belonged to him, the rightful ruler of China; when a Song general led an unprovoked attack on a Western Xia border town, Shenzong appeared at the border to commend the general himself.[36] To punish the Western Xia and damage their economy, Emperor Shenzong also shut down all commercial border markets along the Song-Western Xia border.[36] The scientist and statesman Shen Kuo (1031-1095) was sent to Yanzhou (now Yan'an, Shaanxi province) in 1080 to stave off Tangut military invasion.[37] He successfully defended his fortified position, yet the new Grand Councillor Cai Que held him responsible for the death of a rival Song military officer and the decimation of that officer's forces; hence, Shen Kuo was ousted from office and the state abandoned the projected land that Shen was able to defend.[38]
When Empress Dowager Gao died in 1093, Emperor Zhezong of Song asserted himself at court by ousting the political conservatives led by Sima Guang, reinstating Wang Anshi's reforms, and halting all negotiations with the Tanguts of the Western Xia. This resulted in the continued armed conflict between the Song Dynasty and the Western Xia. In 1099, the Northern Song launched a campaign into Xining and Haidong (in modern Qinghai province), occupying territory that was controlled by the Gusiluo regime since the 10th century.[39] By 1116, Song managed to acquire all of its territory and incorporated it into prefectures; the area became the westernmost frontier against the Western Xia.[40]
Relations with Lý of Vietnam and border conflict
Background
For roughly a millennium, a series of Chinese dynasties had controlled northern Vietnam until the independence of the Ngô Dynasty (939–967). The early Song Dynasty had fought and lost to the Anterior Lê Dynasty (980–1009) of Vietnam at the Battle of Bạch Đằng in 981. The Vietnamese rebel Nùng Trí Cao (1025–1053) attempted to establish his own frontier kingdom in 1042, 1048, and 1052, a disturbance on Song's southern border that was not ignored. The Song launched an invasion against Nùng Trí Cao in the 1050s, resulting in their conquest of border regions inhabited by Tai peoples and a border contention with the Lý Dynasty (1010–1225) that lasted from 1075 to 1077.[41] The Song court's interest in maximizing economic benefits of new frontier zones came into conflict with the Lý, whose goal was to consolidate peripheral fiefdoms.[41] In the aftermath of conflict a negotiation was reached by both sides to fix the borders; the resulting line of demarcation "would largely remain in place through to the present day," according to James A. Anderson.[42]
Border hositilies
The Song general Di Qing (1008–1061) commanded the army which crushed the border rebellion of Nùng Trí Cao in 1053; during this, the Lý court did not intervene.[43] Two decades of relative regional peace ensued, although Lý observed the looming threat of Song imperialism as more Han Chinese settlers moved into areas which the Lý relied upon for extraction of natural resources.[44] A division of Di Qing's soldiers (originally from Shandong) had settled the region, followed by a wave of Chinese settlers from north of the Yangzi River.[45]
The Guangnan West Circuit Fiscal Commissioner Wang Han (fl. 1043–1063) feared that Nùng Trí Cao's kinsmen Nùng Tông Đán intended to plunder the region after he crossed the Song border in 1057.[43] Wang Han took a personal visit to Nùng Tông Đán's camp and spoke with Nùng Trí Cao's son, explaining that seeking "Interior Dependency" status would alienate them from the Lý court, but if they remained outside of China proper they could safely act as loyal frontier militia.[46] Fearing that the Nùng clan would cause a border crisis, Wang Han sent a memorial to Emperor Renzong's (r. 1022–1063) court in 1060 with proposals for a new policy.[47] The Song rejected his proposal and made the Nùng communities (along with other ethnic groups) official dependents of Song imperial authority.[47] Nùng Tông Đán's request that the territories under his authority be incorporated into the Song Empire was granted in 1062.[47] In 1059—six years before the Song court's New Policies under Chancellor Wang Anshi (1021–1086) would organize new self-sufficient militia units throughout the empire and along the border with Đại Việt—the Lý Dynasty ruler Lý Thánh Tông reorganized northern frontier administrative units and had them raise new militias.[48] This would help bolster his kingdom's strength in a time of conflict with Champa (located in southern Vietnam).[48]
In the spring of 1060, Giap Đồng natives under the frontier prefectural leader Thàn Thiệu Thái—an imperial in-law to the Lý court through marriage alliance—raided the Song frontier for cattle and militia recruits.[48] He succeeded in taking the Song military leader Yang Baocai hostage, and in autumn of 1060 Song troops were sent into the frontier to rescue Yang, but he was not found.[48] The Song court appointed Yu Jing (1000–1064) as a new military commissioner of the Guangnan region and charged him with the task of quelling the unrest caused by Thàn Thiệu Thái.[48] Yu Jing sent an agent to Champa to enlist Cham aid against the Song's enemies in Guangnan.[49]
Tribute and intrigue
The Lý court discovered the Song's secret attempt to ally with Champa; while Lý sent a delegation to Yongzhou to thank Song for putting down local rebellions and to negotiate terms of peace, Lý instructed its agents to gather intelligence on the alleged Champa alliance and the strength of Song's military presence in the Guangnan Western Circuit.[49] Two Vietnamese envoys were permitted to offer tribute to the court of Renzong in Kaifeng, arriving on February 8, 1063 to deliver gifts such as nine tamed elephants.[49] On March 30, 1063, Emperor Renzong died and was succeeded by Emperor Yingzong (r.1063–1067); Vietnamese envoys arrived in Kaifeng again to congratulate Yingzong on his ascension, and on April 7, 1063, Yingzong sent gifts such as calligraphy works by Renzong to Vietnamese King Lý Thánh Tông.[49] On the day that the Vietnamese envoy Lý Kế Tiên prepared to depart from Kaifeng back to Đại Việt, news arrived that Thàn Thiệu Thái had raided Song's Guangnan West Circuit again.[50] Although a plea from a Guangnan official urged Kaifeng to take action, Yingzong left defenses up to local Guangnan forces and labeled Thàn Thiệu Thái as "reckless and mad" in an effort to disassociate him from the Lý court.[50]
The minor Song official Lu Shen, a prefect in Guizhou, memorialized the throne in 1065 with a report that Nùng Tông Đán had apparently switched allegiance from Song to Lý, as well as with the Quang Nguyên chieftain Luu Ký.[51] When the now "mentally weak and distracted ruler" Yingzong—as Anderson describes him—received the report, he took no other action but to reassign Nùng Tông Đán with new honorific titles.[51] The court took no actions to remedy this situation, and Nùng Tông Đán later played a key role in the Song-Lý war of 1075–1077.[51] The Song also gave official titles to Vietnamese leaders despite their involvement in Nùng Trí Cao's rebellions and their pledged loyalty to Luu Ký, the latter employed as a tribal official under King Lý Thánh Tông.[52]
Yingzong died on January 8, 1067 and was replaced by Emperor Shenzong (r. 1067–1085), who heaped rewards on Vietnamese leaders like his father did but was more keen and observant of the Vietnamese delegations.[51] When Vietnamese envoys arrived in Kaifeng to congratulate Shenzong on his ascension, he sent lavish gifts to the Lý court, including a golden belt, silver ingots, 300 bolts of silk, two horses, a saddle inlaid with gold and silver plating, and on February 9, 1067 bestowed the Vietnamese ruler Lý Thánh Tông with the official title "King of the Southern Pacified Region" (Nanping Wang).[51] Shenzong also countered Nùng Tông Đán's defection by recognizing his kinsman Nùng Trí Hội as the Nùng clan leader in 1069, giving him a title similar to Tông Đán's and command over Guihua prefecture (also known as Wuyang grotto settlement).[53]
Frontier policy and war
In his New Policies sponsored by Shenzong, Wang Anshi enhanced central authority over Song's frontier administrations, increased militia activity, increased troop levels and war horses sent to the frontiers (including the border areas with Đại Việt), and actively sought loyal supporters in border regions who could heighten the pace of extraction of local resources for the state's disposal.[36] Officials at court debated the merits or faults of Wang's policies, yet criticism of his reforms could be heard even in Đại Việt, where the high officer Lý Thường Kiệt (1019–1105) publicly announced that Wang's policies were deliberate efforts to seize and control their border frontiers.[54] Tensions between Song and Lý were critical, and in these conditions any sign of hostility had potential to ignite a war.
The Quang Nguyên chieftain Luu Ký launched an unexpected attack against Yongzhou in 1075, which was repelled by the Song's Vietnamese officer Nùng Trí Hội in charge of Guihua.[55] Shenzong then sought to cement an alliance with the "Five Clans" of northern Guangnan by issuing an edict which would standardize their once irregular tribute missions to visit Kaifeng now every five years.[55] Shenzong had officials sent from the capital to supervise militiamen in naval training exercises.[55] Shenzong then ordered that all merchants were to cease trade with the subjects of Đại Việt, another indication of heightened hostility that prompted the Lý court under Lý Nhân Tông (r. 1072–1127) to prepare for war.[55]
In the autumn of 1075, Nùng Tông Đán advanced into Song territory in Guangxi while a naval fleet commanded by Lý Thường Kiệt captured Qinzhou and Lianzhou prefectures.[56] Lý Thường Kiệt soothed the fear of the local Chinese populace by claiming he was simply apprehending a rebel who took refuge in China and local Song authorities wouldn't cooperate in detaining him.[57] In the early spring of 1076, Thường Kiệt and Nùng Tông Đán destroyed the Song militia of Yongzhou.[57] During a battle at Kunlun Pass, their forces beheaded the Governor-General of Guangnan West Circuit, Zhang Shoujie (d. 1076).[57] After a forty-two day siege, Yongzhou was breached and razed to the ground.[57] When Song forces came to challenge Lý's forces, the latter retreated with spoils of war and thousands of prisoners.[57]
Since Lý Thường Kiệt had fought the Cham in 1069, Song called on the Khmer Empire and Champa to join the fight in 1076; meanwhile, the Song commander Guo Kui (1022–1088) led the combined Song force of some 100,000 against Lý.[57] The Song quickly regained Quang Nguyên prefecture and in the process captured the resistance leader Luu Ký.[57] By 1077, the Song destroyed two other Vietnamese armies and marched towards their capital at Thăng Long (modern Hanoi).[57] Song forces halted at the Nhu Nguyệt River (in modern Bac Ninh Province), where Lý Thường Kiệt had defensive ramparts built on the southern banks.[57] Despite this, Song forces broke through his defense line and rode cavalry within just several kilometers (miles) of the capital city.[58]
However, the Vietnamese were able to push Song forces back across the river while coastal defenses distracted the Song navy. Lý Thường Kiệt made an offensive, but lost two Lý princes in the fighting at Kháo Túc River.[58] Meanwhile, the tropical climate and rampant disease was severely weakening Song's military forces and the Lý court feared the result of a prolonged war so close to the capital.[58] Thường Kiệt made peace overtures to the Song; after this, the Song commander Guo Kui agreed to withdraw his troops but kept five disputed regions of Quang Nguyên (renamed Shun'anzhou), Tu Lang Châu, Môn Châu, Tô Mậu Châu, and Quang Lang.[58] These areas comprised most of modern Vietnam's Cao Bang Province and Lang Son Province.[58] After a long period of mutual isolation, in 1082 King Lý Nhân Tông of Đại Việt returned Yong, Qin, and Lian prefectures back to Song authorities, along with prisoners of war, and in return Song relinquished its control of four prefectures and one county of Đại Việt, including the Nùng clan's home of Quang Nguyên.[58] Further negotiations took place from July 6 to August 8, 1084 and were held at Song's Yongping garrison in southern Guangnan, where Lý's Director of Military Personnel Lê Van Thình (fl. 1075–1096) convinced Song to fix the two countries' borders between Quang Nguyên and Guihua prefectures.[59]
Partisans and factions, reformers and conservatives
- Further information: Society of the Song Dynasty#Political partisanship and reform
After students passed the often difficult, bureaucratic, and heavily-demanding Imperial Exams, as they became officials, they did not always see eye to eye with others that had passed the same examination. Even though they were fully-fledged graduates ready for government service, there was always the factor of competition with other officials. Promotion to a higher post, higher salary, additional honors, and selection for choice assignment responsibilities were often uncertain, as young new officials often needed higher-ranking officials to recommend them for service.[60] Once an official would rise to the upper echelons of central administration based in the capital, they would often compete with others over influence of the emperor's official adoption of state policies. Officials with different opinions on how to approach administrative affairs often sought out other officials for support, leading to pacts of rivaling officials lining up political allies at court to sway the emperor against the faction they disagreed with.
Factional strife at court first became apparent during the 1040s, with a new state reform initiated by Fan Zhongyan (989–1052). Fan was a capable military leader (with successful battles in his record against the Tanguts of Xi-Xia) but as a minister of state he was known as an idealist, once saying that a well-minded official should be one that was "first in worrying about the world's troubles and last in enjoying its pleasures".[60] When Fan rose to the seat of chancellor, there was a growing opposition to him within the older and more conservative crowd. They disliked his pushing for reforms for the recruitment system, higher pay for minor local officials to discourage against corruption, and wider sponsorship programs to ensure that officials were drafted more on the basis of their intellect and character. However, his Qingli Reforms were cancelled within a year's time (with Fan replaced as chancellor), since many older officials halfway through their careers were not keen on making changes that could affect their comfortably-set positions.[60]
After Fan Zhongyan, there was Chancellor Wang Anshi (1021–1086). The new nineteen-year-old Emperor Shenzong (r. 1067–1085) had an instant liking of Wang Anshi when he submitted a long memorial to the throne that criticized the practices of state schools and the examination system itself. With Wang as his new chancellor, he quickly implemented Wang's New Policies, which evoked some heated reaction from the conservative base. Along with the Baojia system of a community-based law enforcement, the New Policies included:
- Low-cost loans for farmers and replaced the labor service with a tax instead, hoping this would ultimately help the workings of the entire economy and state (as he directly linked state income to the level of prosperity of rural peasants who owned farms, produced goods for the market, and paid the land tax).[61] These government loans replaced the system of landlords offering their tenants private loans, which was prohibited under the new laws of Wang's reforms.[62]
- Government monopolies on tea, salt, and wine in order to raise state revenues (although this would now limit the merchant class).[61]
- Instituting a more up-to-date land survey system in order to properly assess the land tax.[61]
- Introduction of a local militia in order to lessen the budget of expenses paid for upholding the official standing army, which had grown dramatically to roughly 1 million soldiers by 1022.[61]
- The creation of a new government bureau in 1073 called the Directorate of Weapons, which supervised the manufacture of armaments and ensured quality control.[63]
- Introduction of the Finance Planning Commission, created in mind to speed up the reform process so that dissident Conservatives would have less time to react and oppose reforms.[61]
- The poetry requirement of the civil service examination (introduced during the earlier Tang Dynasty) was scrapped in order to seek out men with more practical experience and knowledge.[61]
In addition, Wang Anshi had his own commentaries on Confucian classics made into a standard and required reading for students hoping to pass the state examinations. This and other reforms of Wang's were too much for some officials to bear idly, as there were many administrative disagreements, along with many personal interests at stake. In any case, the rising conservative faction against the reformer Wang Anshi branded him as an inferior-intellect who was not up to par with their principles of governance (likewise, the reformers branded conservatives in the same labeled fashion). The conservatives criticized Wang's reforms as a means of curbing the influence of landholding families by diminishing their private wealth in favor of self-sufficient communal groups.[62] The conservatives argued that the wealth of the landholding class should not be purposefully diminished by state programs, since the land holding class was the essential socio-economic group that produced China's scholar-officials, managers, merchants, and landlords.[62]
Reminded of the earlier Fan Zhongyan, Wang was not about to allow ministers who opposed his reforms to have sway at court, and with his prowess (and perceived arrogance) was known as 'the bullheaded premier'.[64] He gathered to his side ministers who were loyal to his policies and cause, an elite social coalition known as the New Policies Group (新法, Xin Fa).[65] He had many able and powerful supporters, such as the scientist and statesman Shen Kuo. Ministers of state who were seen as obstructive to the implementation of Wang's reforms were not all dismissed from the capital to other places (since the emperor needed some critical feedback), but many were. A more extreme example would be "obstructionist" officials sent far to the south to administer regions that were largely tropical, keeping in mind that northern Chinese were often susceptible to malaria found in the deep south of China.[61] The worst-case scenario of persecution, though, came with Su Shi in 1079, where he was arrested and forced into five weeks of interrogation. Finally, he confessed under guarded watch that he had slandered the emperor in his poems. One of them read:
 |
An old man of seventy, sickle at his waist, |
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This poem can be interpreted as criticizing the failure of the salt monopoly established by Wang Anshi, embodied in the persona of a hard-working old man who was cruelly denied his means to flavor his food, with the severity of the laws and the only salt available being charged at rates that were too expensive. After his confession, Su Shi was found guilty in court, and was summarily exiled to Hubei Province. More than thirty of his associates were also given minor punishments for not reporting his slanderous poems to authorities before they were widely circulated to the educated public.[61]
Emperor Shenzong died in 1085, an abrupt death since he was in his mid 30s. His successor Emperor Zhezong of Song was only ten years old when he ascended to the throne, so his powerful grandmother served as regent over him. She disliked Wang's reforms from the beginning, and sought to appoint more Conservative officials at court who would agree to oppose the Reformists. Her greatest political ally was Sima Guang (1019–1086), who was made the next Chancellor. Undoing what Wang had implemented, Sima dismissed the New Policies, and forced the same treatment upon Reformers that Wang had earlier meted out to his opponents: dismissal to lower or frontier posts of governance, or even exile. However, there was still mounted opposition to Sima Guang, as many had favored some of the New Policies, including the substitution of tax instead of forced labor service to the state. Sure enough, when Emperor Zhezong's grandmother died in 1093, Zhezong was quick to sponsor the Reformists like his predecessor Shenzong had done. The Conservatives once more were ousted from political dominance at court. When Zhezong suddenly died in his twenties, his younger brother Emperor Huizong of Song (r. 1100–1125) succeeded him, and also supported the Reformers at court. Huizong banned the writing of Sima Guang and his lackeys while elevating Wang Anshi to near revered status, having a statue of Wang erected in a Confucian temple alongside a statue of Mencius.[66] To further this image of Wang as a great and honorable statesman, printed and painted pictures of him were circulated throughout the country.[66] Yet this cycle of revenge and partisanship continued after Zhezong and Huizong, as Reformers and Conservatives continued their infighting. Huizong's successor, Emperor Gaozong of Song, abolished once more the New Policies, and favored ministers of the Conservative faction at court.
From Northern Song to Southern Song
Jingkang Incident
Before the arrival of the Jurchens the Song Dynasty was for centuries engaged in a stand-off against the Western Xia and the Khitan Liao Dynasty. This balance was disrupted when the Song Dynasty developed a military alliance with the Jurchens for the purpose of annihilating the Liao Dynasty. This balance of power disrupted, the Jurchens then turned on the Song Dynasty, resulting in the fall of the Northern Song and the subsequent establishment of the Southern Song.
During the reign of Huizong, the Jurchen tribe to the north (once subordinates to the Liao), revolted against their Khitan masters. The Jurchen community already had a reputation of great economic clout in their own region of the Liao and Sungari rivers. They were positioned in an ideal location for horse raising, and were known to muster ten thousand horses a year to sell annually to the Khitans of the Liao Dynasty.[66] They even had a martial history of being pirates, in the 1019 Toi invasion of the Heian Japanese islands in modern-day Iki Province, Tsushima Province, and Hakata Bay. From the Jurchen Wanyan clan, a prominent leader Wanyan Aguda (1068–1123) challenged Liao authority, establishing their own Jin Dynasty (or 'Golden Dynasty') in 1115.[66] The Song government took notice of the political dissidence of the Jurchens in Liao's territory, as Council of State Tong Guan (1054–1126) suggested to the emperor that a military alliance with the Jurchens would be favorable in crushing the Liao once and for all.[66] In a secret alliance and mission of envoys across the borders, an agreement was reached between the Jurchens and the Song government to divide Liao's territory (while the Song would ultimately obtain their coveted prize: the Sixteen Prefectures).
The Liao Dynasty was ultimately crushed by Jin and Song forces in 1125. However, the Jurchens discovered weaknesses about the Song military based in the north (as the Chinese for so long had been sending tribute to the Liao Dynasty instead of actually fighting them). Song forces had failed to make a joint attack in a siege with the Jurchens, who viewed the Song generals as incompetent. Banking on the possibility that the Song were weak enough to be destroyed, the Jurchens made a sudden and unprovoked attack against the Song Dynasty in the north. Soon enough, even the capital at Kaifeng was under siege by Jin forces, only staved off when an enormous bribe was handed over to them. There was also an effective use of Song Chinese war machines in the defense of Kaifeng in 1126, as it was recorded that 500 catapults hurling debris were used.[67] During the siege of Taiyuan, the Jin employed 30 catapults and over fifty carts protected by rawhide and sheets of iron plating so that Jin troops could be ferried to the walls safely to fill in Taiyuan city's defensive moat.[68]
However, the Jin returned soon after with enough siege machinery to scale Kaifeng's layer of walls defended by 48,0000 Song troops.[68] The Jin used siege towers taller than Kaifeng's walls in order to lob incendiary bombs into the city.[68] The besieged city was captured by the Jurchens in less than two months.[69] Three thousand members of the Emperor's court were taken as captives,[70] including Huizong and many of his relatives, craftsmen, engineers, goldsmiths, silversmiths, blacksmiths, weavers and tailors, Daoist priests, and female entertainers to label some.[66][71] The mechanical clock tower designed by Su Song and ereceted in 1094 was also disassembled and its components carted back north, along with many clock-making millwrights and maintenance engineers that would cause a set-back in technical advances for the Song court.[71] According to the contemporary Xia Shaozeng, other war booty included 20,000 fire arrows that were handed over to the Jurchens upon taking the city.[72]
After capturing Kaifeng, the Jurchens went on to conquer the rest of northern China, while the Song Chinese court fled south. They took up temporary residence at Nanjing, where a surviving prince was named Emperor Qinzong of Song in 1127.[70] The eunuch general and statesman Tong Guan, who had initially urged for an alliance with the Jurchens, was executed by Emperor Qinzong (seen as a better fate for a military man than being carted off into captivity by the Jurchens).[73] Jin Dynasty forces halted at the Yangzi River, but staged continual raids south of the river until a later boundary was fixed at the Huai River further north.[74] With the border fixed at the Huai, the Song government would promote an immigration policy of repopulating and resettling territories north of the Yangzi River, since vast tracts of vacant land between the Yangzi and Huai were open for landless peasants found in Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Jiangxi, and Fujian provinces of the south.[75]
A new capital and peace treaty
In 1129, Emperor Gaozong designated the site at Hangzhou (known then as Lin'an) to be the temporary settlement of the court, but it was not until 1132 that it was declared the new Song capital.[74] Hangzhou and Nanjing were devastated by the Jin Dynasty raids; both cities were heavily repopulated with northern refugees who outnumbered the remaining original inhabitants.[74] Hangzhou was chosen not only for its natural scenic beauty, but for the surrounding topographic barriers of lakes and muddy rice-fields that gave it defensive potential against northern armies comprised mostly of cavalry.[76] Yet it was viewed by the court as only a temporary capital while the Song emperors planned to retake Kaifeng.[77] However, the rapid growth of the city from the 12th century to the 13th necessitated long term goals of residency. In 1133 the modest palatial residence of the imperial family was improved upon from a simple provincial lodging to one that at least accommodated strolls with new covered alleyways to deflect the rain.[78] In 1148 the walls of the small palace compound were finally extended to the southeast, yet this was another marginal improvement.[78]
The new triangular arrangement between the Southern Song, Jin, and Western Xia continued the age of division and conflict in China. The region of Huainan (between the Yangzi and Huai rivers) became a new borderland and battleground between Song and Jin from 1128 to 1141, displacing hundreds of thousands of families who had lived there for generations.[79] The Southern Song deployed several military commanders, among them Yue Fei and Han Shizhong, to resist the Jin as well as recapture territory, which proved successful at times. Yue Fei in particular had been preparing to recapture Kaifeng (or Bianjing as the city was known during the Song period), the former capital of the Song dynasty and the then southern capital of the Jin Dynasty, after a streak of uninterrupted military victories.
However, the possible defeat of the Jurchens threatened the power of the new emperor of the Southern Song, Gaozong and his premier Qin Hui. The reason for this was that Qinzong, the last emperor of the Northern Song was living in Jin-imposed exile in Manchuria and had a good chance of being recalled to the throne should the Jin Dynasty be destroyed. Although Yue Fei had penetrated into enemy territory as far as Luoyang, he was ordered to head back to the capital and halt his campaign.[69] Emperor Gaozong signed the Treaty of Shaoxing in 1141 that fixed the borders at the Huai River,[80] as well as conceded territory regained through the efforts of Yue Fei, while Yue was killed during imprisonment. As part of the treaty, the Song were also forced to pay tribute to the Jin Dynasty, much how it did to the previous Liao Dynasty.[69] With the treaty of Shaoxing, hostilities ceased between the Jin and Song dynasties for the next two decades.[81] In the meantime, Emperor Gaozong negotiated with the Jin over his mother's ransom while he commissioned a symbolic art project about her, the Eighteen Songs of a Nomad Flute, originally based upon the life of Cai Wenji (b. 177).[82] Gaozong's mother was eventually released and brought south, but Qinzong was never freed from his confinement in the north.
Decades after Yue's death, the later Emperor Xiaozong of Song honored Yue Fei as a national hero in 1162, providing him proper burial and memorial of a shrine.[83] As a means to shame those who had pressed for his execution (Qin Hui and his wife), iron statues of them were crafted to kneel before the tomb of Yue Fei, located at the West Lake in Hangzhou.
China's first standing navy
As the once great Indian Ocean maritime power of the Chola Dynasty in medieval India had waned and declined, Chinese sailors and seafarers began to increase their own maritime activity in South East Asia and into the Indian Ocean. Even during the earlier Northern Song period, when it was written in Tamil inscriptions under the reign of Rajendra Chola I that Srivijaya had been completely taken in 1025 by Chola's naval strength, the succeeding king of Srivijaya managed to send tribute to the Chinese Northern Song court in 1028.[84] Much later, in 1077, the Indian Chola ruler Kulothunga Chola I (who the Chinese called Ti-hua-kia-lo) sent a trade embassy to the court of Emperor Shenzong of Song, and made lucrative profits in selling goods to China.[85] There were other tributary payers from other regions of the world as well. The Fatimid-era Egyptian sea captain Domiyat traveled to a Buddhist site of pilgrimage in Shandong in 1008 , where he presented the Chinese Emperor Zhenzong of Song with gifts from his ruling Imam Al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah, establishing diplomatic relations between Egypt and China that had been lost during the collapse of the Tang Dynasty in 907 (while the Fatimid state was established three years later in 910).[86] During the Northern Song Dynasty, Quanzhou was already a bustling port of call visited by a plethora of different foreigers, from Muslim Arabs, Persians, Egyptians, Hindu Indians, Middle-Eastern Jews, Nestorian Christians from the Near East, etc. Muslims from foreign nations dominated the import and export industry (see Islam during the Song Dynasty).[87] To regulate this enormous commercial center, in 1087 the Northern Song government established an office in Quanzhou for the sole purpose of handling maritime affairs and commercial transactions.[88] In this multicultural environment there were many opportunities for subjects in the empire of foreign descent, such as the (Arab or Persian) Muslim Pu Shougeng, the Commissioner of Merchant Shipping for Quanzhou between 1250 and 1275.[89] Pu Shougeng had gained his reputable position by helping the Chinese destroy pirate forces that plagued the area, and so was lavished with gifts and appraisal from Chinese merchants and officials.[90] Quanzhou soon rivaled Guangzhou (the greatest maritime port of the earlier Tang Dynasty) as a major trading center during the late Northern Song. However, Guangzhou had not fully lost its importance. The medieval Arab maritime captain Abu Himyarite from Yemen toured Guangzhou in 993, and was an avid visitor to China.[91] There were other notable international seaports in China during the Song period as well, including Xiamen (or Amoy).[92]
When the Song capital was removed far south to Hangzhou, massive numbers of people from the north. Unlike the flat plains of the north, the mountainous terrain riddled with lakes and rivers in southern China is largely a hindrance and inhospitable to widespread agriculture. Therefore, the Southern Song took on a unique maritime presence that was largely unseen in earlier dynasties, grown out of the need to secure importation of foreign resources. Commercial cities (located along the coast and by internal rivers), backed by patronage of the state, dramatically increased shipbuilding activity (funding harbor improvements, warehouse construction, and navigation beacons).[93] Navigation at sea was made easier by the invention of the compass and Shen Kuo's treatise of the 11th century on the concept of true north (with magnetic declination towards the North Pole).[94] With military defense and economic policy in mind, the Southern Song Dynasty established China's first standing navy. China had a long naval history before that point (example, Battle of Chibi in 208), and even during the Northern Song era there were concerns with naval matters, as seen in examples such as the Chinese official Huang Huaixin of the Xining Reign (1068–1077) outlining a plan of employing a drydock for repair of 'imperial dragon boats' (see Technology section below).[95] Already during the Northern Song Dynasty, the Chinese had established fortified trade bases in the Philippines, a noted interest of the court to expand China's military power and economic influence abroad.[96] Provincial armies in the Northern Son